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In the wake of 9/11, Africa was securitised in a new way by the United 
States (US): weak states were believed to pose an existential threat to the US. 
American aid to Africa consequently more than tripled in the years following 9/11. 
Using the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, we investigate the interaction 
between the executive branch as claimant and the US Congress as legitimiser. The 
factors of political agency and context are accentuated in our use of securitisation 
theory. Yet, the evidence also points to structural forces, especially the unequal 




After 11 September 2001, the United States’ African security agenda 
changed. Africa became important because weak states were claimed to be a danger 
to America’s security. Unable to provide for the basic needs of their people and 
lacking full control of their borders, weak states in Africa provided both a breeding 
ground and safe haven for terrorist organisations.   
 
Who initiated the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy? Why and how did 
they do so? Who legitimated the claim and why? We address these questions with 
the help of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory on account of its analysis 
of security agenda-setting.2 We confine our investigation to the interaction of the 
executive branch of government and the legislature. The executive contains the head 
of government, assisted by the civil/public 
service. The legislative branch here refers to 
the US Congress, seen here as an institution 




The point of our answers is to illustrate and advance securitisation theory in 
a way that involves Africa. We try to advance securitisation theory in four ways:  
 we provide indicators of successful securitisation, including but going 
beyond speech acts;  
 we show that securitisation processes over time are linked;  
 we stress the agency of securitising actors as they manoeuvre in the 
political process of agenda-setting; and  
 we emphasise the historical context within which actors are operating. 
 
In our discussion, we – 
 outline the core ingredients of the process of securitisation as understood 
by the Copenhagen School; 
 describe Africa in the pre-9/11 America’s security agenda; 
 describe the major securitising actors’ claims 
 analyse congressional responses; and  
 provide indicators of Africa’s securitisation after 9/11.  
A conclusion ends the discussion.  
 
The process of securitisation 
 
Securitisation theory can be traced back to criticism, most notably first 
developed by Barry Buzan (1983), that security no longer could be “defined as the 
threat, use and control of military force” in the hands of states.3 If security includes 
non-military sectors and non-state actors, security agendas however did not consist 
of a traditional set of issues and sectors but were chosen, constructed or created. 
Securitisation theory wants to analyse why, by whom and how a non-security issue 
became a security issue.  
 
Within this ambit, the approach of Critical Security Studies is known to be 
more cultural in nature, using ideas and habits to explain securitisation.4 In the 
Copenhagen School that emerged in the mid-1990s, one finds, by contrast, a 
powerful combination of a broad approach to security and Ole Waever’s focus on 
the politics of security.5 The Copenhagen School branch of securitisation theory is 
often used because of its more political approach6 to analysing security agenda-
setting: the focus is on the choices made and actions taken by actors in an attempt to 
shape and manipulate the security agenda.7 
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For the Copenhagen School, the securitising interaction of an actor and an 
audience is necessary to move an issue from the normal political agenda to the 
security agenda.  This process consists of (1) a securitising claim made by an actor 
and (2) legitimation by an audience. 
 
The securitisation process begins with an actor claiming that the existence of 
an object is threatened. The given issue must be portrayed as an existential threat, 
meaning that if it is not addressed, the referent object is literally destroyed or it is 
conquered.8 To avoid death or domination, measures must be taken and they must be 
taken immediately, thus moving the issue outside the normal realm of politics and 
into the extraordinary realm of security. The Copenhagen School conceptualises 
security, in the first instance, as a speech act: verbal and textual material transmits a 
threat from actor to audience.9 
 
The audience toward which this claim is directed either rejects the claim, 
thus preventing securitisation, or takes on the argument by echoing the same 
security language about the issue in question. For legitimation or successful 
securitisation to occur, a claim must become sufficiently important for an audience. 
This may be because the claim has been presented as “an existential threat, point of 
no return, or necessity.”10 Legitimation is further dependent upon context; that is, 
the conditions that heighten the probability that claims are going to be accepted. 
Ideological attitudes, trends and views can all help an audience accept a claim. 
Successful securitisation requires that the claim resonate with the audience in which 
it resides.11  
 
Critics have pointed out that the Copenhagen School does not capture the 
full complexity of the agenda-setting process. One area of weakness is the 
simplification of processes of communication. Another weakness lies in the relative 
indifference to complex institutional interactions and the underplaying of social and 
political context.12 To better capture complexity in the agenda-setting process, we 
stress agency and context. 
 
Research: question, evidence and method 
 
We investigate who initiated the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy, why 
and how they did so, and who legitimated the claims. Taken together, our answers 




The format of the article is akin to a theoretical case study, with the intent to 
advance theory and to illustrate a case, and in the belief that the Copenhagen 
School’s approach to securitisation is well suited to the case at hand. Although our 
method is implicitly comparative, we are unable to investigate alternative or 
competing explanations of the post-911 securitisation of Africa by the US. We are 
also unable to investigate whether the US after 911 securitised other parts of the 
world in a manner similar to Africa; thus, we cannot determine whether the African 
case fits into a broader pattern of American securitisation. 
 
We use a wide range of evidence to support our arguments. We draw on 
academic articles and books, reports and Internet sources. Primary sources are 
however most important, specifically official documents, figures and media 
statements, for the simple reason that we seek an answer to changes in official US 
policy.  
 
Securitisation’s past  
 
Throughout the 20th century, American presidents rarely took an interest in 
Africa, presenting it as having but marginal significance for the US. There were 
occasional deviations from this view of the security agenda but not many.13 During 
the Cold War, American policy makers united in their view that the primary purpose 
of the US was to deny the Soviet Union influence in Africa.14 Even so, the US 
stepped back as colonial powers took the lead. When former colonial powers later 
failed or faltered, Africa could become more significant but even then, executive 
branch attention would be mediated by the need to placate America’s NATO allies. 
What little strategic significance Africa had was based on the logic of a global 
geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union. The Communists could strike anywhere, 
at any time, and Africa could be one such place. Africa was a means to deny 
whatever the Soviet Union wanted.15  
 
Once the Cold War ended, the US retreated from Africa.16 Yet, this retreat 
was cut short by new claims about the humanitarian necessity to intervene. 
Humanitarian intervention was not a traditional security issue but one that could, so 
the claim went, be accomplished by America’s unmatched military prowess. The US 
then backed a 1992 UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia.17 The mission's turn 
for the worse caused American withdrawal. Despite subsequent pressure that the US 
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should claim (for example) Burundi, Liberia, Sudan and the former Zaire as security 
issues, the Americans refused to do so. 
 
The refusal to make a (traditional) security claim about Africa was masked 
by rhetoric left, right and centre. In 1998, a "new partnership" came between sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and the US in which democracy and development would be 
the guiding principles. In January of the same year, a "Month of Africa" was 
declared to spotlight pressing issues such as HIV/AIDS and continuing wars. The 
refusal to make a security claim was also legitimated by the anti-colonial theme of 
“African solutions to African problems”. One illustration of this was the African 
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a programme to ready African forces for their 
own peacekeeping. Even this modest programme, intended to keep the US out of 
SSA, was opposed by Congress.18 In 1995, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
maintained that the US had "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa",19 and 
in the 1998 National Security Strategy's Integrated Regional Approaches to Security, 
SSA ranked last.20 Aid to Africa dropped consistently every year following the end 
of the Cold War, reaching just below $700 million in 2000, well below any other 
world region.21 
 
President George W. Bush entered the White House with every intention of 
not making a security claim about Africa, as he famously commented on the 
campaign trail in 2000, "[w]hile Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the 
national strategic interests, as far as I can see.”22 Yet, for all the American refusals to 
make security claims about SSA, securitisation in the 1990s did make at least two 
discursive imprints, visible on the eve of 9/11: 
 
First, some relevance was restored to Africa, albeit a perverse one: Africa 
was a place where disasters are made. The disasters of the time were conceived as 
either genocide of the type seen in Rwanda in 1994, or a public health catastrophe as 
millions died of AIDS. Disasters could not but spill over to others. Furthermore, 
AIDS deaths would leave communities and countries so devastated that they could 
not look after themselves, thus requiring intervention.23 Second, disasters would 
drag the US into Africa because it was the only major country with the military and 
other resources, for example, transport aircraft and aircraft carriers, capable of 
responding. The US’s executive and legislative branches showed great anxiety about 
being dragged into trouble in this way and devised reasons why it would not get 
involved. One line of reasoning was to claim Africa’s wars were barbaric with the 
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desirable conclusion that nobody in their right mind would willingly lower 
themselves into the “new war” cesspool. Others claimed that, even if the US were 
prepared to intervene, a mistimed intervention could be ineffective24 or make things 
worse.25  
 
Context: 9/11 and the core executive 
 
A considerable amount of literature has shown how the Bush White House 
was shocked and surprised by the events of 9/11 but soon also developed 
considerable cynicism in its response. The moral integrity and sincerity of the actors 
in the process of securitisation are, however, not at issue here. The more relevant 
conceptualisation is that the Bush administration developed a set of ideas about 9/11 
and how to prevent another 9/11. Why the Bush White House responded as it did 
has been explained in radically different ways. 
 
One type of explanation stressed impersonal, or structural, factors about the 
nature of power. Having supposedly bested the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the 
US inevitably became triumphalist and complacent. Shaken by 9/11, the US 
overreacted.26 Other scholars focused on how the end of the Cold War destabilised 
America’s security paradigms. The War on Terror provided an opportunity to return 
to old paradigmatic comforts: enemies were everywhere; they could strike at any 
moment; they could strike with devastating effect, etc.27  
 
For many other scholars the claim making of the Bush administration 
centred on the beliefs of its core members, the Vulcans. They were bound together 
by similar experiences in their rise to power. Among others, they had been 
opponents of the Vietnam Syndrome, and would subsequently argue for a more 
active, executive-driven foreign policy that included the use of war. The events of 
9/11 merely provided them with public justification for why this should be so.28 
 
Other scholars argue that the Vulcans’ personalities mattered more than their 
beliefs. Much attention was devoted to Vice-President Cheney’s authoritarian 
personality: he saw the nature of executive power as a monarchist and had a history 
of aggressive attempts at creating that royal power in the US.29 Others saw Vice-
President Cheney’s assertions not as so self-motivated. He became important 
because of another personality: President George W Bush. Already for reasons of an 
oedipal conflict believing he needed a crusade comparable to the “greatest” 
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American generation’s accomplishments in World War II, President Bush 
manufactured such a mission out of 9/11.30 
 
Despite the debates over who did what and why, scholars agree the initial 
definitions of 9/11 contained three points of emphasis. First, an existential threat 
existed: “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, DC, New 
York City, and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America 
and its allies.”31 National Security advisor Condoleezza Rice, in support, stated, 
“there is no longer any doubt today that America faces an existential threat to our 
security—a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, World War II, or 
the Cold War”.32 Second, the US was entitled to use force: “our response involves 
far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect 
one battle, but a lengthy campaign.”33 Both the US government and the American 
people thought they had been victimised by the surprise nature of the attacks, the 
killing of unarmed civilians, and the cruelty inflicted on individuals. The victims 
were politically and morally entitled to respond. Third, Americans were told to 
prepare themselves for a war anywhere in the world. The early claims of the core 
executive were desperately short on details. Another layer of claim making about 
this or that method, opponent, and place would have to follow.   
 
Making claims about Africa: the executive as securitising actor 
 
Since the early 1980s, policy-makers and scholars in primarily Europe and 
the UK had started to question the traditional separation of development and 
security. Although the security-is-development thesis could be intellectually dodgy, 
for example, in its circular reasoning, it had become accepted by the end of the 
1990s. Rather than just providing humanitarian relief when development failed, 
countries’ development failures had to be prevented. If not, their failures would 
threaten others.34  
 
The Vulcans’ claims about Africa after 9/11 did not, in other words, emerge 
out of thin air. The reasoning they were so aggressively trying to promote had been 
in circulation for some time: Africa was a “disaster”. The failed-state idea was 
irresistible: they generated dangers that were going to be visited upon American 
people on American soil.35 Africa was now a “high priority” on the US security 
agenda.36 The new claim about Africa acquired political ballast through the 
endorsements of institutions attendant to the core executive. Just two months after 
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9/11, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) held a briefing on 
“Africa, Islam and Terrorism”.37 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) issued 
a special report on “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa”.38 The Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) established the first Africa policy division of any US think tank, 
promptly producing a series on the national security implications of the current 
African condition.39 In addition, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) reported about the need of a comprehensive security-development approach 
to underdevelopment in Africa.40  
 
Agencies involved in programmes such as African Contingency Training 
and Assistance (ACOTA), AFRICOM, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), were enthusiastic.41 The 
DoD saw Africa developing into a terrorist haven. Extremists were exploiting areas 
“struggling with resource scarcity, weak national institutions, poverty and 
inexperienced militaries … endemic imbalances in the distribution of wealth … and 
disenfranchised youth”.42 The State Department agreed, “Africa today is a place 
of...severe challenges, such as poverty, disease, terrorism, and instability that all 
together pose critical risks for US interests.”43 Development aid acquired a similar 
justification: “Aid is a potent leveraging instrument for keeping countries allied with 
US policy while they win their own battles against terrorism.”44 
 
In the end, just about every African issue became linked to security.45 Did 
the claims about failed states and terror in Africa have validity? As the 9/11 
Commission later would show, the US was ill informed and ill prepared about 
African conditions, including the conditions that would give rise to the use of 
terror.46 However, the core had first access to information, regardless of the quality 
of that information. Having first access to information, gave the core executive a 
tremendous advantage in the process of securitisation: when challenged, they could 
remind their critics that they did not know what they were talking about. What 
mattered was who possessed information and when.  
 
Context: 9/11 and the Congressional audience 
 
When the 9/11 attacks occurred, Congress was in session. Between 2001 and 
2003, the Democratic and Republican parties were evenly represented in the Senate, 
with the majorities changing parties on several occasions, but for the remaining 
time, the Republicans were the majority party. In the House of Representatives, the 
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Republican Party was in the majority between 2001 and 2006. In 2006, the 
Democratic Party gained control of both the House and the Senate. Congress was 
later to be victimised by letters containing anthrax but by then – 9 October 2001 – 
Congress had already made their views known. In debates and in legislation (for 
example, revision of the Patriot Act), members of the US Congress drew parallels 
between 9/11 and the attack on Pearl Harbour. They referred to Americans’ 
“surprise, unreadiness, and lack of organisation”, thus paving the way for new actors 
and a new discourse to emerge.47  
 
Congressional actions were linked to a shift in constituents’ views. 
Numerous publications across disciplines showed that Americans’ concern about the 
threats posed by terror greatly increased with 9/11. Having been shocked, their 
“political makeup” shifted.48 A series of surveys indeed showed that Americans’ 
fear of terror and especially trans-national terror increased to one of the top-ranked 
security concerns.49 Psychological studies conducted after 9/11 showed that the 
“attacks resulted in immediate and visibly evident increases in expressions of 
national identification and unity throughout the United States”.50  
 
One obvious reason for the heightened sense of vulnerability was that some 
of the qualities of the violence on 9/11, for example, fire, is known to alarm people, 
and another was that the attacks occurred in the least expected place, American soil. 
The spread of the heightened sense of vulnerability can be also attributed in large 
part to virtual mobilisation or the creation and manipulation of public opinion 
through the media, sustained by nearly blanket media coverage.51 All four major 
American news networks (ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX) suspended regular 
programming and provided uninterrupted coverage for the first five days following 
the fall of the Twin Towers.52 In other parts, the spread of heightened vulnerability 
had to do with being a participant in 9/11 without having been a direct victim. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, the NY Stock Exchange’s 7-day closure meant financial activity 
was disrupted on a national scale. Air travel was at first prohibited and then arduous. 
These measures, however necessary, made many more people feel victimised.  
 
The evidence thus shows that the events of 9/11 had become a major feature 
of Americans’ national frame of reference for security. For legislators, the 
heightened sense of vulnerability among Americans created a clear cost/benefit 




Legitimating claims about Africa: the legislature as securitising actor 
 
How was the legislature persuaded to legitimate the claim made by the core 
executive? Did contextual factors play any role in this legitimation? We consider 
legislative approval to determine not only that the requests were authorised, but that 
the logic behind this authorisation was based on the security-oriented rationale 
posed by the actors.  
 
Were legislators pushed by their constituents? Did the reasoning of failed 
African states make terror spread among Americans along with their previously 
noted rise in a sense of vulnerability? According to our own estimate, printed media 
11 September 2001 through 31 December 2007 published 13 253 news stories on 
the subject of Africa. Less than 18 per cent of these were connected with the subject 
of national security and less than 8 per cent were connected with the subject of 
terrorism, with the possibility that some of these overlapped, giving stories 
associated with both subjects double representation.53 The lack of Africa coverage 
may be interpreted in many ways but strongly suggests continued indifference 
among Americans towards Africa. The inattention to Africa is also certainly 
connected to views about foreign aid. A Gallup poll conducted from 2002 to 2007 
consistently found each year that around 60% of the population believed that too 
much foreign aid was being included in the federal budget.54   
 
While Congressional hearings held after 9/11 on the subject of Africa 
stressed security risks emanating from the African continent, the weak-state message 
found little support in public opinion or, more specifically, the media, even in a 
period marked by initiatives to bring Africa to the fore, such as “Make poverty 
history” and the 2005 “Live 8” concert series. This created room for the legislators 
to bring their own, more personal and political views into the legitimation but still, 
they faced consistent constituent pressure to endorse the core executive’s claims and 
the new funding proposals. 
 
Did the legislators believe in the post-9/11 reasoning about Africa? Some 
representatives were vocal but it is impossible to identify personal acceptance of the 
executive’s claims.55 Contrastingly, there is abundant evidence that legislators knew 
of their constituents’ greater sensitivity about security and made a habit of inserting 
references to it in any debate and speech.56 In other words, political and indeed 
electoral interests drove their speech acts. If the legitimation had been turned over to 
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the American people, for example in a referendum, the core executive’s claim would 







A striking feature of post-9/11 US Africa policy is the increase in military 
assistance, including military training programmes, regional counterterrorism 
operations, and the creation of a US military command centre. Military training 
programmes are managed and funded through the State Department but 
implemented by the US Department of Defense (DoD). The most prominent of these 
programmes in post-9/11 African use are IMET, the FMF and the ACOTA 
programmes.  These programmes are intended to educate and train foreign military 
leaders, provide for their weapons and other equipment acquisition, and build the 
capacity of African states to respond to crises in their territories. Just three months 
after 9/11, Congress approved a revision of ACOTA. Originally a programme that 
trained African forces in “non-lethal” peacekeeping operations, ACOTA became 
more “robust”, and included training in lethal force capabilities.57 
 
Military assistance programmes are funded and administered primarily by 
the DoD with some contribution by State and the CIA. Four major programmes have 
been created since the 9/11 attacks, intended to enhance the effectiveness of law 
enforcement and military forces in strategic regions on the continent through direct 
military-to-military engagement exercises:  
– the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA);  
– the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI);  
– the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); and  


















36 5 0 36 0 0 
Foreign military 
financing 
926 372 1 299 1 126 1 395 4 191 
International military 
education and training 
7 332 10 586 9 786 10 168 9 350 9 930 
Miscellaneous 
military aid 
0 0 0 0.3 0 2 262 
Unified command 823 2 016 1 717 0 0 2 278 
Peacekeeping 
operations* 
47 55 78 30 199 232 
Regional Center for 
Security Studies 
553 2 264 2 044 2 618 4 545 3 084 
Service-sponsored 
activities 
261 355 1 233 519 569 766 
TOTAL 9 978 15 653 16 252 15 871 17 437 25 143 
*ACOTA funding through peacekeeping operations taken from United States 
Department of State, 2007. 
 
A US military command centre for Africa was announced in February 2007. 
This would create a regional command for Africa comparable to those for Europe 
and the Pacific. Congress approved the new command centre. The African 
Command (AFRICOM) is staffed by high-level officials from the Department of 
State and USAID in addition to the DoD. This is not unusual; other regional 
commands also have political officials as advisors. What is exceptional about 
AFRICOM is the extent of these officials’ involvement. A senior US diplomat 
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serves as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA), ranked at 
the same level as the DoD’s Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations 
(DCMO). Alongside the DCMO, this diplomat manages programmes associated 
with “non-traditional” security-related issues such as de-mining, disaster response, 
security sector reform, and peace support operations.59  
 
As is evident in Table 1, US military aid to SSA increased dramatically as 
Congress funded the requests of the Bush administration about US national security 




After 9/11, three new developmental programmes were developed, each 
justified as being a necessary measure to reduce the terrorism security threat. Two of 
these programmes, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and 
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) were primarily focused on Africa. The 
third programme, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), was begun 
during the Clinton administration but extended during the Bush administration. In 
numerical terms, the total amount of official aid (or ODA) provided to sub-Saharan 
Africa comes from a range of accounts, including PEPFAR, the MCA, AGOA but 
also the Economic Support Fund, Child Survival and Health, and Food for 
Education, etc.  
 
As is evident from Table 2, ODA received a substantial boost in the years 
following 9/11, going up from $1.3 billion in 2001 to $4.6 billion in 2007: 
 
Table 2. Development aid: official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (in 
millions) 60 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 375,77 2 372,29 4 642,58 3 504,05 4 065,02 5 602,85 4 567,8 
 
AGOA and the expanded US–Africa trade initiative enjoyed widespread 
Congressional support after 9/11. Originally set to expire in 2008, AGOA has been 




Table 3. Development Aid: Millennium Challenge Account (in USD millions)  62    
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
994 1 488 1 752.3 1 752.3 
Note: Numbers represent total MCA funding; not available by geographic region. 
 
As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, Congress also authorised both the MCA 
and PEPFAR. These programmes have seen substantial increases in assistance to 
Africa. While the appropriations numbers are not reported according to geographic 
region, a solid majority of both accounts’ resources go to sub-Saharan Africa, as 
intended in their inception.63 
 
Table 4. Development aid: global HIV/AIDS funding/PEPFAR (in millions)64 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
840 1 200 1 500 2 300 2 700 3 300 4 500 
Note: PEPFAR appropriations begin Financial Year 2004 (FY2004) 
 
Institutional consequences: jurisdictional expansion 
 
After 9/11, US Africa policy saw increasing DoD control over what had 
been a Department of State-managed aid structure implemented by military 
personnel. The new training programmes under direct DoD management allowed the 
DoD to bypass both State Department and Congressional oversight stipulations. 65  
 
The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was 
initially authorised by Congress in 2002 as a temporary DoD appropriation for 
education in strategy and doctrine provided by the US to foreign militaries, but was 
granted permanent authorisation and legal status the following year, making the 
programme the same as the State Department-funded IMET programme.66 The 
significance of the CTFP’s funding through the DoD as opposed to the State 
Department is seen in its avoidance of legal restrictions imposed on IMET 
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concerning eligible participants, in effect opening up the same training provisions to 
those agents barred from IMET. 
 
The DoD similarly sought to circumvent the American Service-members’ 
Protection Act (ASPA). ASPA prohibits military engagement with countries that 
had not signed a bilateral agreement with the US guaranteeing that Americans will 
not be transferred to the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration 
issued 17 waivers to African countries during the period of this study.67 In 2006, 
Congress rescinded the restriction on IMET training.68 
 
The same process repeated itself over Section 1206, originally a temporary 
provision for the DoD to fund Iraqi and Afghan military training without the 
involvement of the State Department. At that time, war-time need was said to justify 
circumvention of time-consuming State Department processes.69 In 2006, other 
countries’ military training needs led Congress to approve the DoD as sole authority 
to plan, implement and fund those programmes through DoD-accounts.70 Since the 
inception of the expanded Section 1206, Africa has already seen significant growth 
in its share of the funding as evidenced by the jump from $13 million in 2006 to 
$44.9 million in 2007. These funds are used in military training and counterterrorism 
operations accounts.71 
 
The changes in the US Africa development aid structure also witnessed a 
loss of State Department and USAID power to the DoD. In the ODA, the 
distribution of aid – who gets what – is striking. One study reported that ODA 
increases were being used to increase military sectors in “either petroleum exporting 
countries or countries whose support had been enlisted in the USWOT, such as 
Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan”.72 Another study noted that non-
traditional military aid conducted through accounts such as Section 1206 was 
augmenting military aid; the share of ODA assistance provided through the DoD 
rather than USAID or State, for example, had gone from 5.6 per cent in 2002 to 21.7 
per cent in 2005.73 
 
Speech-acts as consequences: existential threats to the US from Africa 
 
Previously framed as a humanitarian concern with little relevance to 
American security, Africa has been reframed as a place where underdevelopment 
created desperate populations vulnerable to the promises of extremists and where 
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weak governments are unable to detect or apprehend those extremists. In Africa, 
promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. 
This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – 
and our strategic priority – combating global terror ... [the United States] must help 
strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous 
borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to 
deny havens for terrorists.74 
 
The Department of Defense introduced its post-9/11 National Military 
Strategy with reference to the threat emanating from the African continent: 
“adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories 
from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks”.75  These claims 
have been sustained for many years. In 2006, for example, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice still insisted:  
It was … (once) assumed that weak and poorly governed states were 
merely a burden to their people, or at most, an international 
humanitarian concern but never a true security threat. 
Today … geographic regions are growing ever more integrated 
economically, politically and culturally. This creates new 
opportunities but it also presents new challenges, especially from 
transnational threats like terrorism …76 
 
The portrayal of Africa as a threat to the US has support in Congress and 
thus, by implication, of the America people. Legislators directly and usually without 
qualification have endorsed the core executive’s claims about weak African states: 
It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region can be 
ignored, and that is especially true of Africa. The general weakness 
of African governments, as well as the civil strife which exists in 
several countries, makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds 
for terrorist operations.77 
 
Having previously claimed that failing states pose dangers for intervention, 
post-9/11 claims were that failed states generated dangers that were going to be 








How was Africa securitised after 9/11? We considered only the executive 
and the legislature in our investigation. Who initiated claims, how and why? And 
who legitimated the claims, how and why? 
 
The US core executive initiated the process after 9/11, claiming that African 
underdevelopment represented an existential threat to Americans. Unable to provide 
for the basic needs of their people and lacking full control of their borders, weak 
states provide both a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorist organisations. 
Congress legitimated these claims by creating programmes or funding programmes 
for a War on Terror in Africa. 
 
However complex the interaction between the claimant (the core executive) 
and the legitimiser (the legislature) became, the political advantage clearly belonged 
to the core executive. The core executive defined the threat and how they did so was 
determined by key individuals in an epistemic community. This epistemic 
community’s views of the causes of terror were not necessarily valid but the core 
executive’s claim had acquired political ballast through the executive’s early and 
privileged access to information. The core executive also had rewards, like money 
and status, to attach to those who accepted their claims. When the claims reached the 
audience, the US Congress, the legislators were reacting to the core executive’s 
claims: the legitimiser was not an entity capable of interaction with the core 
executive on an equal footing. Although we have examined one case only, it is likely 
that the unequal interaction is structural in nature and therefore probably present in 
other comparable cases. 
 
The attacks of 9/11 created a context. In the light of their constituents’ 
heightened fears, the congressional legitimisers were keen to display an awareness 
of security, mentioning it wherever they could. Some legislators were quite vocal in 
repeating the reasoning of the core executive. And with great regularity the 
legislators deferred to – legitimated – the core executive’s requests. The majority of 
American voters remain opposed to foreign aid, regardless of how it is dressed up, 
and greater public involvement probably would result in failed securitisation. Why 
legislators endorse the core executive’s claims in all likelihood derived from being 
intimidated by the core executive or from their fear of losing political capital with 




From a more theoretical perspective, this case suggests greater attention be 
paid in the structural positions of actors in the process of securitisation. Within 
government, the core executive enjoys immeasurable advantages. The legislature as 
legitimiser seems destined to play the role of reactor, with all the disadvantages that 
arriving second entails.  
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